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COPYRIGHT LIABILITY FOR THOSE WHO PROVIDE THE
MEANS OF INFRINGEMENT: IN LIGHT OF THE RIAA
LAWSUITS, WHO IS AT RISK FOR THE INFRINGING ACTS OF
OTHERS?
Karen Horowitz1
©Karen Horowitz
Abstract
To date, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
has become increasingly tough on the illegal downloading of
copyrighted materials. In light of the increased prevalence of
suits against minors or persons with little ability to pay,
individuals or institutions that provide the means for the
infringing activities, such as guardians or network owners
(including, for example, the owner of an unsecured home
network or the owner of an Internet café), need to be aware of
the potential liability they might face. To place liability upon an
individual or institution providing Internet access, a plaintiff
could file suit for indirect copyright infringement under the
doctrines of vicarious liability, contributory infringement, or
inducement. Alternatively, to receive damages from the
guardian of a minor child, the plaintiff could file suit against the
minor child and attempt to satisfy any judgment from that
claim through state parental liability statutes. This Article will
discuss these approaches to liability and the risks facing these
classes of actors.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>As of June 2006, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) had brought suit against 17,587 individuals.2  This group
includes Vickey Sims, the mother of a teenager, Nicole Phillips, who
downloaded 1,200 MP3s by artists such as George Strait and Kirk
Franklin.3  Although Sims “does not even know how to download a
song,” the RIAA is seeking a $75,000 judgment against her.4  The
group of 17,587 individuals also includes Marie Lindor, a woman
who does not even own a computer, but left an unsecured,
unencrypted wireless router operating in her apartment.5  These
claims raise the issue of whether an individual or institution, such
as the owner of an unsecured network or of an Internet café or the
guardian of a minor child, that did not directly engage in any
infringing activity, may be held liable under existing law.6  Because
the guardians of minor children are so often in the position of
providing the means through which another individual engages in
copyright infringement, examining the ways in which a copyright
holder can extend liability to guardians serves to illustrate the
manner in which liability could be placed on other network owners.
<2>A record company could file suit for indirect copyright
infringement under the doctrines of vicarious liability, contributory
infringement, or inducement if it wanted to place liability upon
either a guardian for the alleged infringing activities of a child, an
Internet café owner for the activities of a customer, or a network
owner for the activities of a user.7  Although this would not permit
the record company to reach the network owner or Internet café
owner directly, the record company could alternatively file suit
against the minor child and attempt to satisfy any judgment from
that claim through state parental liability statutes. The merits of
these claims are highly dependent upon the specific facts involved.
In the typical file-sharing cases, where the individual or institution
providing the means for the infringement is unaware of the
infringing activity, there is little risk of liability. However, where
there is tacit approval or encouragement of the infringing action,
indirect liability could possibly be found. This Article will discuss
these approaches to indirect liability and these classes of actors in
turn.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
<3>Vicarious copyright liability is found when the defendant has the
right and ability to control the infringing activity, as well as a direct
8 2
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financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.  Each
of these elements presents a unique obstacle to indirect liability
when considered in the context of a network owner or a guardian.
Control
<4>First, to be held accountable under a theory of vicarious
copyright liability, the network owner or guardian must have the
ability to control the actions of the direct infringer.9  It appears
that to be held vicariously liable, the network owner or guardian
must have “the practical, rather than the strictly legal, ability to
control the activities of the direct infringer.”10  However, in some
cases, legal authority over the infringing actor has been held
sufficient to meet the control requirement. For example, the Ninth
Circuit, in Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, held that the operator of a
swap meet, who had a contractual right to exclude a vendor for
any reason, possessed the control required to establish vicarious
liability.11  In Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the sponsor
of a television program was also held vicariously liable for failing to
exercise its contractual right to review scripts so as to prevent
copyright violations from occurring.12
<5>Conversely, particularly where the exercise of legal authority
would be impracticable, other courts have declined to hold that it is
sufficient to establish the control element of vicarious liability.13
For example, in Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Canus Productions, Inc., a
California federal district court found that the ability of the landlord
to control the crowds and the flow of traffic into a trade show, or
to respond to theft or vendor disputes within the trade show
complex, was not equivalent to the practical ability to police the
content of vendors’ booths.14  In a similar case, Bevan v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., the sponsor of a television program was
not held vicariously liable for copyright infringement even though
he possessed the contractual right to request alterations of the
script prior to filming.15
<6>In the case of a guardian with an infringing child, it may be
very difficult for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the guardian
possessed the requisite level of control. The guardian’s computer
expertise, the time, place, and manner in which the infringing
activities occurred, and other factual considerations will certainly be
at issue in determining whether this element of liability has been
met.16  For example, in situations where the guardian has no
computer knowledge and the computer is solely used by the minor
child, it seems implausible that a court would find that the guardian
had control over the minor child’s infringing activities. As the
guardian’s computer expertise and involvement in the child’s use of
the computer increases, control is more likely to be found. This
point was demonstrated in Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. 3
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Santangelo, where the court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs’ direct infringement claim against her, but
expressed skepticism that “an Internet-illiterate parent, who does
not know Kazaa from a kazoo,” could be held liable for copyright
infringement committed by a child who downloads music over the
Internet without the parent’s knowledge or permission but using
the parent’s Internet account.17
<7>More sophisticated network owners, however, should be aware
that they could easily be found to have control over the activities
of the direct infringer. While a home wifi operator may be found to
have no more control than a typical guardian, in the case of an
Internet café owner, for example, a certain degree of computer
expertise may be presumed. Moreover, by taking steps to secure
the network or to prevent access to certain known file-sharing
websites, an ability that a sophisticated network owner is more
likely to possess than a guardian or a home wifi operator, the
network owner would be able to prevent the infringing activities in
most cases.
Financial Benefit
<8>The defendant network owner or guardian must also receive a
financial benefit from the infringing activity in order to be held
accountable under vicarious copyright liability.18  To satisfy this
element, there must be a “causal relationship between the
infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps.”19
Accordingly, in Roy Export Establishment Co. v. Trustees of
Columbia University, the university was not found vicariously liable
because it received no financial benefit when a university student
group showed a copyrighted film on campus.20  Similarly, in
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment
Distributors and Northwest Nexus, Inc., a website hosting company
was not vicariously liable for hosting a site that contained
copyrighted images because it charged a flat hosting fee and its
profits did not depend on traffic generated by the alleged
infringement.21  However, the financial benefit need not directly
flow from the infringing activity. In Davis v. E.I.DuPont De Nemours
& Co., the sponsor of an infringing television show was found to
benefit from increased sales which were a result of the program’s
publicity.22
<9>In typical file-sharing cases, a plaintiff would probably be unable
to demonstrate that either a guardian or a network owner derives a
financial benefit from the infringing actions of another party
because the infringing actions typically only provide benefits for
that actor. It could be argued that a guardian does benefit from the
minor child’s infringement because the guardian would otherwise
have purchased the songs for the child.23  It is rarely the case, 4
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however, that a guardian would purchase all the music for the
minor child; there are no studies where a reputable surveyor such
as Gallup actually demonstrates that the albums would have been
purchased if they had not been downloaded instead.24  Whether a
network owner will be deemed to derive a financial benefit from
the infringement is highly dependent on the particular factual
situation involved. Network owners are more likely to be found
vicariously liable when they intend for third parties to access their
networks than when the third parties gain access without the
network owner’s awareness.25  The Napster court, for example,
found that “financial benefit exists where the availability of
infringing material acts as a draw for customers.”26  Accordingly, if
a network owner profits by providing a service where third parties
are lured by the ability to commit infringing acts, he can be held
vicariously liable. An Internet café owner may need to be wary
here; if it could be shown that customers were visiting the café due
to their ability to commit copyright infringement there, a financial
benefit could be found.
<10>It should be noted, however, that there are currently no cases
holding that the mere owner of an Internet account is vicariously
liable for the infringing activities of third persons.27  To make a
sufficient case of vicarious liability, the plaintiff must specifically
allege that the defendant profited from a direct infringement; the
allegation that the defendant owned the Internet account alone is
not enough.28
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
<11>If the elements for vicarious liability are not met, a defendant
network owner or guardian may alternatively be held liable if he
knowingly “induces, causes, or materially contributes to” 29  the
copyright infringement.30
Material Contribution
<12>Some courts have held that a defendant materially contributes
to the infringing activity by providing the “site and facilities.”31  In
Fonovisa, the court found that the operator of a swap meet who
provided “space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and
customers” to the direct infringers could be liable for contributory
copyright infringement.32  Similarly, in Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., a company which
provided a service that automatically distributed all Usenet postings
did satisfy the material contribution element of contributory
infringement.33
<13>However, defendants are not considered to have materially 5
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contributed to the infringing activities when the assistance provided
is not directly related to the infringing activities.34  For example, in
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association, the
defendant was not held liable for providing credit card processing
services to a copyright infringer because those services did not
directly assist the infringing activity.35  Likewise, in Demetraides v.
Kaufman, the sale of an unimproved lot upon which an infringing
house was subsequently built did not constitute a material
contribution to the infringing activity.36
<14>Whether or not a guardian has materially contributed to the
infringing activities of this child is likely to depend on the particular
support and resources provided. This would be the case as well
with a network owner and its relationship to third parties. Providing
access to an Internet connection (and perhaps to a computer as
well) is likely to be viewed by the court as a material contribution,
as it is analogous to the site and facilities provided in Fonovisa.
However, as discussed below, given the substantial non-infringing
uses of those resources, a guardian probably does not need to fear
liability for contributory infringement.
Knowledge
<15>The defendant network owner or guardian must also have
knowledge of the direct infringement to be found liable for
contributory copyright infringement. The knowledge standard is
generally recognized as the objective “[know], or have reason to
know” standard.37  There is no requirement that the defendant
have actual knowledge of the infringement. In Screen Gems-
Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., the court held that
advertisers and distributors could be held liable for contributory
copyright infringement if they should have known of the
infringement based on indications such as a product prices far
below market value.38  Similarly, in Aveco, the court found that a
video rental store that rented out rooms with videocassette players
could be held liable even without actual knowledge that copyrighted
materials were being played in those rooms.39
<16>Mere knowledge that copyright infringement might possibly be
occurring, however, is not sufficient to support a claim of copyright
infringement. In Adobe v. Canus, the court held that receiving a
letter referring to possible sales of infringing products was not
enough to establish knowledge of infringement.40  The U.S.
Supreme Court also has declined to find that the knowledge
requirement of contributory copyright infringement is met when the
material provided has substantial non-infringing uses. In Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court held that
manufacturers of videocassette recorders were not liable for
infringing uses of the technology because the recorders could 6
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legitimately be used for time-shifting.41
<17>However, a defendant may be liable for infringement if a
person or entity is willfully blind to the knowledge of the infringing
activity.42  In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, the court held that
although a finding of contributory trademark infringement required
the defendant to have knowledge that the mark was counterfeit, it
was sufficient that the defendant failed to inquire further because
he was afraid of what the inquiry would yield.43
<18>In the typical file-sharing cases, a guardian would probably not
meet the knowledge standard since computers and Internet
connections have substantial non-infringing uses. Although the
guardian’s computer expertise and knowledge of file-sharing would
likely come into play, it seems unlikely that liability would be
imposed given the possible educational value of providing computer
access to children. However, in a situation where the guardian was
aware of the infringing activities of their child, guardians could be
facing liability. Home network owners are less likely than guardians
to be directly aware of the infringing acts of another party.
However, they may face liability under the “reason to know” prong
because they are operating a network without supervising how it is
being used at all. This is another situation where the network
owner’s computer expertise would come into play. Internet café
owners may face the most risk of liability here if their business is
targeted in such a way as to give them “reason to know” that
infringement is occurring.
INDUCEMENT
<19>In June 2005, the Supreme Court recognized inducement as a
distinct form of contributory copyright infringement.44  In MGM v.
Grokster, copyright holders sued the distributors of free software
used primarily to download copyrighted materials. The distributors
argued that they could not be found liable for contributory
infringement since substantial non-infringing uses for the software
existed. The court, however, held that a person who distributes a
device with the goal of encouraging copyright infringement is liable
for the resulting incidents of infringement which occur.45  Using the
theory of inducement, a copyright holder may prevail on a claim of
contributory infringement if he can prove that the accused has
made an affirmative act directed at encouraging infringing uses and
has the intent of promoting copyright infringement.46
<20>Inducement is unlikely to be relevant for most typical
guardian/child file-sharing lawsuits. However, network owners who,
for example, own a coffee-shop or a similar establishment and
encourage customers to bring in their computers and use the
network may risk liability if they are seen as encouraging acts of
7
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infringement to occur.
STATE PARENTAL LIABILITY
<21>Copyright owners might also attempt to hold guardians liable
for the infringing activities of their children by using state laws
which assign liability to parents for the torts of their minor
children.47  Although this analysis will differ based on the
peculiarities of state law, in general, two questions should be
considered: (1) the applicability of the law to the tort of copyright
infringement; and (2) whether the law is preempted by the
Copyright Act.48
Applicability to Copyright Infringement
<22>Common law generally precludes the collection of judgments
against “assets in which the judgment debtor has no interest,”
which includes the assets of the parent of a minor child.49  Many
states, however, have carved out an exception to this rule in the
case of willful misconduct and have allowed parental liability based
on damage the child has done to “property.”50  In some states,
these statutes may apply only to the damage of physical property,
rendering them inapplicable to cases of copyright infringement.51
If, however, the parental liability statute extends to intangible
intellectual property, then copyright infringement might be found to
cause harm or damage.
<23>In addition, state parental liability statutes have various
standards of intent that must be met before parental liability will be
found.52  Some states require only “willful conduct” on the part of
the minor, while others require that the harm itself be willful.53
Others go further and require “willful and malicious” activity for
parental liability.54  This differs from the intent standard in a typical
copyright case; in states requiring malice or an intent to cause
harm, the plaintiff must prove this further element before parental
liability for the minor child’s infringement will be applied.55
<24>Assuming that the statute is applicable to copyright
infringement, and that the conduct of the child meets the statutory
intent requirements, the amount of damages that may be assessed
against the guardian may be limited by the statute.56  If such a
statutory cap exists, the court will need to decide whether it is to
be applied to each instance of copyright infringement or as an
overall cap on liability for the entire course of infringement.
<25>The California Court of Appeals grappled with a similar issue in
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek.57  There, the parents were held liable
under California’s parental liability statute for multiple instances in 8
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which their sons and sons’ friends hacked into the phone company
network in order to make long-distance phone calls.58  Without
resolving the issue, the court identified three possible
interpretations of the California statute which placed a monetary
cap on liability for “each tort:” (1) each individual instance of
hacking could be treated as a separate tort; (2) each session could
be treated as a tort; or (3) the entire course of action could be
treated as a collective tort.59
<26>In the case of copyright infringement caused by illegal file-
sharing or downloading of music, the difference would be dramatic.
Treating the entire course of file-sharing as a tort would sharply
limit parental liability, while considering each song as a separate
tort could lead to astronomical damages against the guardian.
Preemption
<27>The application of state parental liability statutes to copyright
actions may be barred by the doctrine of preemption. An action
brought under state law may be expressly preempted by section
301 of the Copyright Act or may be subject to a field
preemption.60
<28>Section 301 of the Copyright Act bars all claims based on
state-granted rights “that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright…”61  Whether or not a
state action is explicitly barred is generally determined by the
“extra-element test:” if the state claim requires an extra element
beyond those required for copyright infringement, then it is not
equivalent and therefore not preempted.62  The extra element must
change the nature of the claim so that it is qualitatively different
from a copyright infringement claim.63  For example, a claim based
on contract law satisfies the extra-element test and is not
preempted by the Copyright Act,64  but claims that add only an
element relating to the defendant’s state of mind do not satisfy the
extra-element test and are preempted.65
<29>In the case of a claim made using a state parental liability
statute, the court may find that the claim is founded on a violation
of the rights enumerated in the Copyright Act, and that such claims
are therefore preempted. Alternatively, the courts could decide that
the scope of those against whom damages may be collected is
distinct from the issue of the original infringement, and that such
claims are therefore not explicitly preempted.66
<30>Even if claims using state parental liability statutes are not
expressly preempted by section 301, they may still be barred by a
field preemption. A court could find that the Congressional intent to
create indirect copyright liability conflicts with any state law
9
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creating alternate forms of indirect liability, and is accordingly
preempted by the Supremacy Clause.67
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT SAFE HARBOR
<31>The simplest and cheapest way a network owner may protect
against liability for copyright infringement resulting from users'
actions is to comply with the safe harbor provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).68  Under the statutory definition
provided in the DMCA, network owners are considered to be
“service providers.”69  The DMCA prevents service providers from
being found liable for copyright infringement, provided that they
meet certain requirements. First, the service provider must not
initiate the transmission of the infringing material, and cannot be
responsible for the selection of the material or the recipients
except through automatic processes. Further, the service provider
must also not retain a copy of the infringing material and must not
modify its content.70
Limitations to the Safe Harbor Provisions
<32>The DMCA does not grant blanket protection from copyright
infringement liability.  The service provider may not take advantage
of the DMCA's safe harbor provision if: (1) the service provider has
actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material
on the system or network is infringing; (2) the service provider is
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or (3) the service provider does not expeditiously
remove or disable access to the material upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness of the infringing material.71  In addition, if
the network owner has the right and ability to control the infringing
activity and if the network owner receives a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity, the network owner
will not be protected by Section 512 of the DMCA.72
CONCLUSION
<33>Although it would be likely to occur only under rare
circumstances, network owners and guardians could potentially face
liability for the infringing activities of their children or third parties
using theories of vicarious liability, contributory infringement,
inducement, or through a state parental liability statute. These
claims are very fact-specific. In the typical file-sharing cases,
where the guardian or network owner is not particularly skilled with
computers and has no knowledge of the infringing actions, there is
little risk of liability. However, in other situations, particularly where
the guardian or network owner receives a clear financial benefit
10
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and tacitly approves of or encourages the infringing action, indirect
liability could possibly be found.
<< Top
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